- multistreaming (new): RTMP ingest + multi-platform fan-out with pluggable providers (Twitch/YouTube/Kick/custom), zero-knowledge key vaults, Authelia OIDC auth, shared rooms with editor/streamer roles, single-use invites, per-account streaming grants, and scenes & composition (grid/PiP layouts, text/image overlays, per-output audio routing). - installer: support Dockerfile build in metadata (not just image) and RSA key generation for the Authelia OIDC JWKS. - authelia: add OIDC provider with portainer + multistreaming clients (public + PKCE). - services: remove allprox; add nginx-proxy-manager and portainer; update lldap; regenerate catalog.
81 lines
3 KiB
JavaScript
81 lines
3 KiB
JavaScript
'use strict';
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const assert = require('node:assert/strict');
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const test = require('node:test');
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const {
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enroll,
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silentUnlock,
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recover,
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encryptSecret,
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decryptSecret,
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randomBytes,
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} = require('../src/vault');
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const PASSWORD = 'correct horse battery staple';
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const AAD = 'fp:abc123|sess:xyz789';
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test('enroll → silent unlock works with correct AAD', async () => {
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const deviceKey = randomBytes(32);
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const { serverWrapped, deviceWrapped, salt } = await enroll({
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password: PASSWORD,
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deviceKey,
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deviceAad: AAD,
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});
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const vk = await silentUnlock(deviceKey, deviceWrapped, AAD);
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assert.equal(vk.length, 32);
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assert.ok(serverWrapped.iv && serverWrapped.data);
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assert.ok(salt);
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});
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test('silent unlock fails if session/fingerprint AAD changes', async () => {
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const deviceKey = randomBytes(32);
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const { deviceWrapped } = await enroll({ password: PASSWORD, deviceKey, deviceAad: AAD });
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await assert.rejects(
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silentUnlock(deviceKey, deviceWrapped, 'fp:abc123|sess:DIFFERENT'),
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/decrypt|operation/i,
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);
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});
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test('silent unlock fails with a different device key (copied blob)', async () => {
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const deviceKeyA = randomBytes(32);
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const deviceKeyB = randomBytes(32);
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const { deviceWrapped } = await enroll({ password: PASSWORD, deviceKey: deviceKeyA, deviceAad: AAD });
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await assert.rejects(silentUnlock(deviceKeyB, deviceWrapped, AAD), /decrypt|operation/i);
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});
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test('recover with correct password works (new device)', async () => {
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const { serverWrapped, salt } = await enroll({ password: PASSWORD });
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const vk = await recover(PASSWORD, salt, serverWrapped);
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assert.equal(vk.length, 32);
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});
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test('recover with wrong password fails', async () => {
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const { serverWrapped, salt } = await enroll({ password: PASSWORD });
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await assert.rejects(recover('wrong password', salt, serverWrapped), /decrypt|operation/i);
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});
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test('account secret round-trips, and fails with wrong account AAD', async () => {
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const { serverWrapped, salt } = await enroll({ password: PASSWORD });
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const vk = await recover(PASSWORD, salt, serverWrapped);
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const wrapped = await encryptSecret(vk, 'sk_live_secret_key_123', 'acct:twitch-1');
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const secret = await decryptSecret(vk, wrapped, 'acct:twitch-1');
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assert.equal(secret, 'sk_live_secret_key_123');
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// The same ciphertext can't be re-attributed to a different account.
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await assert.rejects(decryptSecret(vk, wrapped, 'acct:kick-2'), /decrypt|operation/i);
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});
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test('server never sees plaintext: wrapped blobs contain no secret bytes', async () => {
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const deviceKey = randomBytes(32);
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const secret = 'sk_topsecret';
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const { serverWrapped } = await enroll({ password: PASSWORD, deviceKey, deviceAad: AAD });
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const vk = await silentUnlock(deviceKey, (await enroll({ password: PASSWORD, deviceKey, deviceAad: AAD })).deviceWrapped, AAD);
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const wrappedSecret = await encryptSecret(vk, secret, 'acct:1');
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const allBlobs = JSON.stringify({ serverWrapped, wrappedSecret });
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assert.ok(!allBlobs.includes(secret), 'ciphertext must not leak the plaintext secret');
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});
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